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Cyber Attack Treaty Verification 
GRANT HODGSON* 
Abstract: A successful cyber treaty would require an effective 
way for each party to verify that the other parties were living 
up to their obligations. Despite the differences between cyber 
weapons and traditional weapons, verification methods used 
in treaties that limit nuclear weapons have several parallels 
that would be useful in a cyber treaty. Intrusion detection 
and network monitoring of the networks that a state controls 
parallels with national technical means. Cyber investigations 
using session reconstruction, log inspection, and traffic 
analysis would be a useful parallel to on-site inspections. In 
addition, data exchanges containing details about the most 
destructive cyber weapons would reduce the risk of attacks 
on critical infrastructure but still enable states to use 
intelligence gathering capabilities of cyber weapons. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 A new cyber espionage group was discovered in 2014. It is 
suspected to be part of the Chinese government and has been named 
Axiom.1 The group has been operating for at least six years,2 and it has 
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1 Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, FBI Warns Industry of Chinese Cyber Campaign, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-
warns-industry-of-chinese-cyber-campaign/2014/10/15/0349a00a-54b0-11e4-ba4b-
f6333e2c0453_story.html. 
2 Kaila Brosey, Cyber Security Coalition Releases Full Report on Large-Scale Interdiction of 
Chinese State Sponsored Espionage Effort, Novetta (Oct. 24, 2014), 
https://www.novetta.com/2014/10/cyber-security-coalition-releases-full-report-on-large-
scale-interdiction-of-chinese-state-sponsored-espionage-effort/. 
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infiltrated over 43,000 computers, including computers in 
corporations and those owned by governments around the world.3 
Axiom has focused on economic targets including technology 
companies and other political targets that might threaten the stability 
of the Chinese government.4  
 Attacks similar to those performed by Axiom have led to an 
increased focus on cybersecurity by the United States5 and other 
countries. One complicating factor in combating cyber attacks is the 
problem of attribution.6 When a state discovers that a cyber attack has 
occurred, it is difficult to obtain conclusive proof that another state 
sponsored the attack. For example, conclusive proof may include 
specific text embedded in the code or the use of coding techniques 
known to be used by specific countries or groups. Similar to the attack 
on Sony, proof may also be obtained by placing malware on the 
networks used by attackers.7 States are often able to deny involvement 
with any cyber attack. For example, China consistently denies U.S. 
accusations of cyber attacks and in return makes its own accusations 
of cyber attacks coming from the United States.8 In regard to 
3 Franz-Stefan Gady, The Axiom Report: Cybersecurity and Its Impact on China-U.S. 
Relations, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-
gady/the-axiom-report-cybersec_b_6101206.html. 
4 Brosey, supra note 2. 
5 Damian Paletta, White House Aims to Harden Cyberattack Defense, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-aims-to-harden-
cyberattack-defense-1421023121. 
6 See Major Erik Mudrinich, Cyber 3.0: The Department of Defense Strategy for Operating 
in Cyberspace and the Attribution Problem, 68 A.F. L. REV. 167 (2012); Susan W. Brenner, 
"At Light Speed": Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINALITY 379, 409-29 (2007) (explaining the difficulty of attributing cyber 
attacks to a particular attacker); Duncan Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 373 (2011). 
7 David Sanger & Martin Fackler, N.S.A. Breached North Korean Networks Before Sony 
Attack, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/world/asia/nsa-tapped-into-north-korean-
networks-before-sony-attack-officials-say.html. 
8 Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, FBI Warns Industry of Chinese Cyber Campaign, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-
warns-industry-of-chinese-cyber-campaign/2014/10/15/0349a00a-54b0-11e4-ba4b-
f6333e2c0453_story.html; Simon Denyer, China calls U.S. hacking accusations 
‘irresponsible and unscientific’, WASH. POST (June 5, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-calls-us-hacking-
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accusations about Axiom, the Chinese Embassy stated that, "judging 
from past experience, these kinds of reports or allegations are usually 
fictitious."9 
 Many authors have suggested that a cyber treaty would be helpful 
to limit cyber attacks like the ones made by Axiom and others.10 A 
cyber treaty could reduce the recent increase in cyber attacks,11 and 
could help to limit the motivations for a devastating attack on U.S. 
critical infrastructure.12 If a cyber treaty were to be successful, 
however, it would need an effective way for each party to verify that 
the other parties were living up to their obligations. According to one 
U.N. General Assembly resolution, “effective verification is an 
essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament 
agreements.”13 The purpose of verification is to “build confidence 
among states and ensure that agreements are being observed by all 
parties.”14 For example, on-site inspections and information 
exchanges were used to verify Syria’s compliance with international 
accusations-irresponsible-and-unscientific/2015/06/05/7989cad3-583f-417e-a0b7-
34be46eb16ff_story.html.  
9 Franz-Stefan Gady, The Axiom Report: Cybersecurity and Its Impact on China-U.S. 
Relations, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/franzstefan-
gady/the-axiom-report-cybersec_b_6101206.html. 
10 See Rex Hughes, A Treaty for Cyberspace, 86(2) INT'L AFF. 523, 541 (2010); Comment, 
Stephen Moore, Cyber Attacks and the Beginnings of an International Cyber Treaty, 39 
N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 223 (2013); J. Stein Schjolberg, Recommendation for Potential 
New Global Legal Mechanisms Against Global Cyberattacks and Other Global Cybercrimes: 
An International Criminal Tribunal for Cyberspace (ICTC) Cybercrimelaw (Feb. 22, 2013, 
1:45 AM), http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/documents/ICTC.pdf; David Weissbrodt, Cyber-
Conflict, Cyber-Crime, and Cyber-Espionage, 22 MINN. J. INT'L L. 347 (Summer 2013); 
Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: 
Competing Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 Geo. J. Int'l L. 971, 993 (Summer 2011) 
("Despite the support for this approach, both the details for how such a [cyber] treaty 
would function and whether there is sufficient political will to make it a reality remain 
uncertain."). 
11 David Sanger & Martin Fackler, supra note 7.  
12 Particia Zengerle, NSA chief warns Chinese cyber attacks could shut U.S. infrastructure, 
REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/21/us-usa-security-
nsa-idUSKCN0J420Q20141121. 
13 1988 UN Assembly Res: A/RES/43/81. 
14 Id. 
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agreements to destroy its chemical weapons.15 Syria was required to 
submit information describing the chemical weapons Syria 
possessed.16 Syria was also subject to on-site inspections of facilities 
used for production and research of chemical weapons.17 
 However, given current technology, the fundamental differences 
between cyber weapons and traditional military weapons present 
challenges to verification techniques used in the past. This paper will 
discuss the challenges in constructing, implementing, and verifying a 
cyber attack treaty.  Part II will discuss the nature of cyber attacks and 
what makes them difficult for verification purposes. Part III will 
describe techniques that have previously been used to verify other 
treaties.  Each technique is evaluated for its potential efficacy when 
applied to cyber attacks.  
II. CYBER ATTACK FUNDAMENTALS 
 It is important to have a basic understanding of cyber attacks to 
understand why traditional verification techniques would be 
ineffective when applied to a cyber treaty.18 There are many known 
forms of cyber attacks including Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attacks, IP spoofing attacks, Man-in-the-Middle attacks, DNS re-
directs, and—perhaps the most common—social engineering attacks. 
In this section I will discuss the basics of malware and advanced 
persistent threats (APTs) because they are the kind of sophisticated 
attack a state would employ. 
A. Malware Basics 
 Cyber attacks typically rely on software vulnerabilities and 
malware (short for malicious software) to carry out the attacker’s 
desired effect.19 Malware often incorporates backdoors20 and various 
15 Decision Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, OPCW Executive Council, 
http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf. 
16 Id. at 3. 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 For a good description of the hacking cycle and common forms of attack see PATRICK 
ENGEBRETSON, THE BASICS OF HACKING AND PENETRATION TESTING (2013). 
19 There are many different kinds of malware. There are overwriting viruses that overwrite 
the host files with their own malware code. CHRISTOPHER ELISAN, MALWARE, ROOTKITS & 
BOTNETS: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 11 (2013). Some are known as parasitic infectors because 
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other features such as the ability to evade detection21 and send 
sensitive information back to its controller. Attackers will often use 
social engineering to trick an unsuspecting user into installing the 
malware.22 This occurs when a user clicks on a link embedded in an 
email or downloads an infected file from a compromised website. In 
addition, malware often has a rootkit23 component that allows the 
intruder to gain control over the computer and perform any type of 
command from a remote location.24  
B. Advanced Persistent Threats 
 One type of advanced attack that would likely be used by a well-
funded state actor is an advanced persistent threat (APT). The goal of 
they “attach themselves to the host file during infection” then “take control of the host file’s 
first instruction to point to the virus code. After the virus execution concludes, control is 
passed to the host program.” Id. at 14. There are also boot-sector viruses that infects the 
boot sector of a disk to get control of the computer system’s execution flow even before the 
operating system.” Id. at 15. Network Worms are “Malware that replicates itself to multiple 
systems in the network with little or no user intervention using widely used network 
services such as browsing, e-mail, and chat.” Id. at 22. A trojan horse is malware in 
disguise because “it passes itself as a harmless, legitimate program such as a game or a 
tool, easily convincing the user to execute it.” Id. at 25.  
20 Backdoors “enable an attacker to gain access to a compromised system, bypassing any 
form of safeguards and authentication, usually through the use of undocumented OS and 
network functions.” Id. They can be embedded in software that might otherwise serve a 
legitimate purpose. Remote access tools (RAT) are related to backdoors. They have 
additional features such as user interfaces and client components that allow the user to 
issue commands to the compromised computer. Id. 
21 Evasive Malware Goes Mainstream, HELPNETSECURITY (April 22, 2015), 
http://www.net-security.org/malware_news.php?id=3022. 
22 ELISAN, supra note 19. Malware will also have a regeneration component that rebuilds 
malware. Id. at 96. The regeneration component checks periodically if the malware still 
exists. If it does not, then it rebuilds the malware from an “encrypted backup source found 
in the compromised system or downloads it directly from a malware-serving domain.” Id.  
23 A “Rootkit is an application (or set of applications), that hides its presence or presence of 
another application (virus, spyware, etc.) on the computer, using some of the lower layers 
of the operating system (API function redirection, using of undocumented OS functions, 
etc.), which makes them almost undetectable by common anti-malware software.” What is 
a Rootkit, AVG HOME SUPPORT (2016), 
https://support.avg.com/SupportArticleView?l=en_US&urlName=What-is-rootkit. 
24 Root is the most privileged user on a computer. ELISAN, supra note 19 at 40. A “[r]ootkit 
is a set of tools that enables root level access on a computer system.” Id. 
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an APT is to be persistent; gain access to a computer system and 
maintain a presence on the system for “long-term control and data 
collection.”25 With a successful APT, an attacker will complete a 
number of stages including reconnaissance, scanning, exploitation, 
maintaining access, and removing evidence.26 
 During the reconnaissance stage, attackers gather information on 
the target through publicly available sources. This may include public 
websites of a company or the social media profiles of employees.27 For 
example, an attacker may look at technical job postings on the target’s 
website because they often give clues about what kind of hardware 
and software the target is using.28 If the attacker knows the target’s 
hardware and software the attacker might figure out what type of 
techniques would be effective in an attack. By the end of the 
reconnaissance stage the attacker has gathered a large number of IP 
addresses that belong to the target network.29 
 In the scanning stage, an attacker identifies the specific ports30 
and services that the target network is running.31 The attacker also 
performs vulnerability scanning during this stage.32 Through 
vulnerability scanning the attacker can discover “known weaknesses 
in the services and software running on a target machine.”33 
25 Colin Tankard, Advanced Persistent Threats and How to Monitor and Deter Them, 
NETWORK SECURITY JOURNAL 16 (2011). 
26 ENGEBRETSON, supra note 18, at 14. 
27 Tony Sager, Killing Advanced Threats in Their Tracks: An Intelligent Approach to 
Attack Prevention (SANS Inst., July 2014), https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/analyst/killing-advanced-threats-tracks-intelligent-approach-attack-
prevention-35302. 
28 ENGEBRETSON, supra note 18, at 25.  
29 Id. at 53. 
30 Port, TECHTARGET, http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/port (last visited 
May 5, 2016) (“In programming, a port (noun) is a "logical connection place" and 
specifically, using the Internet's protocol, TCP/IP, the way a client program specifies a 
particular server program on a computer in a network.”). 
31 ENGEBRETSON, supra note 18, at 53. The attacker will often use a scanning tool such as 
Nmap during this stage.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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 In the exploitation stage, the attacker typically makes an initial 
compromise where it gains access to the target network.34 The 
attacker might take advantage of a software vulnerability or use social 
engineering including phishing and spear phishing.35 
 In the maintaining access stage, attackers establish a foothold, 
ensuring that they can “access and control one or more computers 
within the victim organization” from outside the organization’s 
network.36 To maintain presence, attackers might install new 
backdoors and different malware on multiple computers.37 Attackers 
then try to gain access to more resources within the target 
organization’s network by escalating privileges.38 One way this can be 
done is by obtaining usernames and passwords from people with 
greater privileges such as network administrators.39 Attackers perform 
internal reconnaissance using operating system commands to obtain 
information about the target organization’s network including 
“computers, trust relationships, users, and groups.”40 The attacker 
issues a command (such as the “net” command if the computer is 
using windows) on the victim system to see if any other computers are 
connected to the same system.41 If the victim system is part of a 
network (e.g. connected to a company network), the attacker will then 
begin scanning ports from the victim system.42 The scan allows the 
attacker to identify services running on other systems, and learn 
34 Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT (Feb. 2013), 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf at 63. 
35 Tankard, supra note 25, at 16-17.; Kim Zetter, Hacker Lexicon: What Are Phishing and 
Spear Phishing, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/hacker-lexicon-
spear-phishing/. 
36 Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, supra note 34, at 63. 
37 Id. at 64. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Tankard, supra note 25, at 17.  
42 Binde, McRee & O’Connor, Assessing Outbound Traffic to Uncover Advanced Persistent 
Threat, SANS 3, available at http://www.sans.edu/student-files/projects/JWP-Binde-
McRee-OConnor.pdf. 
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valuable information about the network.43 Essentially, the scan lets 
the attacker create a map of the network. Once the attacker has the 
network mapped out, the attacker may move to targeting high priority 
victims that have access to valuable data.44  
 Often attackers will have to move laterally (to other computers) 
within the target organizations network because the initially 
compromised systems do not contain the information that the 
attackers are after.45 Once entry is gained onto a computer in a 
system, attackers use a technique known as pivoting. Pivoting involves 
exploiting “the systems they have compromised to attack other 
systems on the same network and avoid restriction such as those set 
by firewalls.”46 Pivoting allows them to explore the company’s 
network, look for intellectual property and other data, and then send 
the data to the command and control servers.47 
 Finally, during the remove evidence stage, attackers make efforts 
to cover their tracks. This may include clearing event logs and erasing 
command history.48 Log files49 record events such as successful or 
unsuccessful logins and security events.50 Thus, log files are one way 
that the target can discover what has taken place on their network. In 
Linux systems, previous commands issued on the computer will be 
43 Tankard, supra note 25, at 17.  
44 Binde, McRee & O’Connor, supra note 42.  
45 Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units, supra note 34, at 64. 
46 Tankard, supra note 25, at 17.  
47 Command and Control Server, TECHTARGET, 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/command-and-control-server-CC-server (last 
visited on Apr. 11, 2015) (“A command and control server (C&C server) is the centralized 
computer that issues commands to a botnet (zombie army) and receives reports back from 
the coopted computers.”). 
48 Hack Like a Pro: How to Cover Your Tracks & Leave No Trace Behind on the Target 
System, WONDERHOWTO (2014), http://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-like-
pro-cover-your-tracks-leave-no-trace-behind-target-system-0148123/. 
49 “A file that lists actions that have occurred. For example, Web servers maintain log files 
listing every request made to the server. With log file analysis tools, it's possible to get a 
good idea of where visitors are coming from, how often they return, and how they navigate 
through a site.” Vangie Beal, Log File, WEBOPEDIA (2016) 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/L/log_file.html.  
50 Hack Like a Pro, supra note 48. 
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recorded in command history.51 This also gives the target clues as to 
what has occurred recently, giving the attacker reason to erase it.  
 APTs are deemed advanced because once entry is gained, the 
attackers are able to avoid detection.52 They use multiple techniques in 
combination, such as coupling zero-day exploits with social 
engineering.53 Malware used in APTs is often able to recompile its 
code and use encryption to prevent detection from virus scanners. 54 
The malware used in APTs is also stealthy.55 APTs “aim to appear as 
close as possible to legitimate network traffic.”56 Victims are “often 
unaware of an attack until after the organization has been 
compromised.”57 One example of an APT is Operation Aurora. It was 
discovered by Google in 2010, and began with emails that were sent to 
carefully targeted Google employees.58 The emails contained links to 
websites that “hosted malicious code used to exploit a zero-day 
vulnerability59 in the Internet Explorer browser.”60 The attack used 
around twelve pieces of malware with “several layers of encryption to 
obfuscate the attack and avoid common detection methods.”61 The 
attackers also used “backdoors to communicate with remote 
[c]ommand and [c]ontrol [] centers via TCP port 443, which is usually 
51 Narad Shrestha, The Power of Linux “History Command” in Bash Shell, TECMINT (June 
14, 2013), http://www.tecmint.com/history-command-examples/. 
52 Tankard, supra note 25, at 16. 
53 Advanced Persistent Threats and Other Advanced Attacks, WEBSENSE 4 (2011), available 
at https://www.websense.com/assets/white-papers/whitepaper-websense-advanced-
persistent-threats-and-other-advanced-attacks-en.pdf. 
54 Tankard, supra note 25, at 16. 
55 Advanced Persistent Threats and Other Advanced Attacks, supra note 53. 
56 Tankard, supra note 25, at 16.  
57 Gordon Thomson, APTs: A Poorly Understood Challenge, NETWORK SEC. J. 11 (2011). 
58 Tankard, supra note 25, at 17.  
59 What is a Zero-Day Vulnerability?, PCTOOLS, http://www.pctools.com/security-
news/zero-day-vulnerability/ (last visited on Apr. 11, 2015). 
60 Tankard, supra note 25, at 17.  
61 Id. 
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associated with encrypted traffic and which is therefore difficult to 
inspect.”62  
 As can be seen from the above explanation, APTs and other cyber 
attacks are very different from traditional military weapons. While 
traditional military weapons such as tanks and missiles tend to be 
state monopolized, cyber weapons can be created and used by 
anyone.63 In addition, cyber weapons are much more multipurposed 
than traditional military weapons. The cyber weapon that provides 
access to a computer can also be used in the destruction of the 
computer. While traditional military weapons are used mainly for 
destruction purposes, cyber weapons can be used for gathering 
information as well as destruction.64 Cyber attacks are also much more 
difficult to detect when compared to traditional attacks such as 
bombings. These fundamental differences are the reason why 
verification techniques used for controlling nuclear weapons would 
have some challenges if used in a cyber treaty. The next section will 
discuss techniques used in verifying compliance with nuclear arms 
treaties and explain potential cyber parallels and the efficacy of those 
parallels if used in a cyber treaty. 
III. VERIFICATION 
 Verification methods are the techniques that treaty signatories use 
to determine whether other signatories are in compliance with their 
treaty obligations. Verification is an essential element of any arms 
control treaty because without it, signatories have no reason to trust 
the other parties to the treaty.65 Verification must be strong enough to 
enable the involved parties to trust each other but not too intrusive 
that it becomes impractical. The minimum intrusion required has 
been described as “a level of verification intrusiveness sufficient to 
convince treaty signatories that other signatories cannot cheat in a 
militarily significant manner without such non-compliance being 
detected in sufficient time to negate any advantage gained by the 
62 Id. 
63 Anyone can download tools, such as Kali Linux, that facilitate hacking. See 
https://www.kali.org/. 
64 Kim Zetter, An Unprecedented Look at Stuxnet, the World’s First Digital Weapon, 
WIRED (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/11/countdown-to-zero-day-stuxnet/. 
65 See Zengerle, supra, note 12.  
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violator.”66 The goal of verification is to “provide clear and convincing 
evidence of compliance or non-compliance and [allow] parties to 
maintain confidence in each other as they [seek] to limit [weapons].”67  
 After World War II, several verification approaches have been 
used in treaties that limit nuclear weapons.68 The techniques used in 
the treaties fall into the following categories: 1) National technical 
means (NTM)(e.g., the use of satellites to look at missile silos); 2) On-
site inspections (OSI) (e.g., physical inspections of military bases); 3) 
Data exchanges (e.g., exchanging data about the technical details and 
capabilities of weapons); and 4) The use of committees to clarify and 
negotiate ambiguities found in treaties. 
 This section will focus on the above-mentioned techniques that 
were used in treaties that limited nuclear weapons between the United 
States and the USSR. It will describe each technique in more detail 
and discuss how the technique would apply to cyber verification. The 
techniques come from the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties 
(SALT),69 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)70 treaty, the 
Strategic Arms Reduction treaties (START I and START II),71 the Test 
Ban treaties72, and the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT).73 These treaties 
66 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 11 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
67 See 1988 UN Assembly Res., supra note 13. 
68 See, e.g., Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Apr. 8, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. No. 111-5 (2010); Treaty on the 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, U.S.-USSR, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 
[hereinafter ABMT].  
69 Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms, U.S.-USSR, May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3462 [hereinafter SALT I Interim 
Agreement]. 
70 Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-
USSR, Dec. 8, 1987, 100 U.S.T. 1 [hereinafter INF Treaty]. 
71 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-USSR, July, 31, 
1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 102-20 (1992) [hereinafter START I]; Treaty on Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-Russ., Jan. 3, 1993, S. TREATY 
DOC. No. 103-01 (1993) [hereinafter START II]. 
72 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under 
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
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served to limit escalations in the development of nuclear weapons.74 
Many of the treaties limited nuclear weapons by reducing the number 
of each party’s missile launchers and warheads.75 Some of the treaties 
focused on launchers because they are large, difficult to hide, and are 
required for a nuclear strike.76 Following a description of each 
technique, I will discuss how effective the technique would be in a 
cyber treaty.  
A. National Technical Means
 National Technical Means (NTM) include a nation’s “technological 
capabilities, collection systems, and other intelligence and analytical 
resources” that can be used to gather information about the activities 
of actors around the world.77 It is one of the most widely used 
verification methods because it is easy for one state to use even 
without an agreement from another state. NTM includes satellite, 
radar, radioactive air sampling, and other signals intelligence. Other 
specific examples of NTM methods include image and signal collecting 
satellites, seismic detectors, nuclear radiation detectors, radar, and 
infrared light detectors.78 Most NTM technologies allow a state to 
gather information without entering another state’s territory.79 To 
make the NTM techniques more effective, NTM is often accompanied 
by treaty requirements that force cooperation between parties.  
73 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 
U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT]. 
74 Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) I and II, U.S DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
75 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Strategic Offensive Reductions (START I), NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, 
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaties-between-united-states-america-and-
union-soviet-socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-i-start-ii/ (last visited 
Apr 10, 2015). 
76 Kifleyesus-Matschie, supra note 66, at 36. 
77 RICHARD SCRIBNER ET AL., THE VERIFICATION CHALLENGE 47 (1985). 
78 Kifleyesus-Matschie, supra note 66, at 24. 
79 Clarence Smith, CIA's Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology, CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/watching-the-bear-essays-on-cias-
analysis-of-the-soviet-union/article04.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
2016] HODGSON 243 
Satellites have been especially helpful to verify compliance with 
nuclear arms treaties. Satellites allow a state to see things all over the 
world, and allow a state to focus on a particular area if needed.80 
Further, the typical ways satellites are used are not considered 
violations of sovereignty.81 Thus, states do not need to obtain 
permission from other states to use satellites. In addition, sites that 
are being monitored do not know exactly how and when they are 
being monitored.  
 The SALT regime used NTM and contained agreed upon rules that 
increased the verification abilities of NTM. For example, the parties 
established methods for tabulating the number of missiles held by a 
party.82 The parties also used assumptions as long as they were not 
proven wrong “to compensate for dependence on a limited number of 
monitoring methods.”83 For example a silo observed by a NTM 
satellite was considered to contain the maximum number of missiles it 
could hold.84 In addition, parties were required to notify each other of 
ICBM launches.85 Further, items that were banned but looked like an 
uncontrolled item were required to have distinguishing features added 
to them.86 
 The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) also relied heavily 
on NTM. It had cooperative measures allowing NTM to be more 
effective than it otherwise would be.87 The treaty defined what the 
80 Kifleyesus-Matschie, supra note 66, at 28. 
81 See Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); Corfu 
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 6, 43 (Apr. 9, 1949) (individual opinion of Judge 
Alvarez). 
82 Kifleyesus-Matschie, supra note 66, at 35. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 31, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1200 
(available at: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/187150.htm). 
86 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 35 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
87 Amy Woolf, Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control 23 (2011) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41201.pdf. 
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limited strategic nuclear delivery vehicles were and how warheads 
were to be counted.88 In INF, NTM was also coupled with cooperative 
agreements. For example, the USSR periodically had to open sliding 
roofs of SS-25 missile shelters to be examined by satellites (because 
the SS-20 missile was similar to SS-25 and only the SS-20 was 
prohibited).89  
 The Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) treaties prohibited testing nuclear 
bombs that carried a payload greater than 150 kilotons.90 They 
contained some cooperative measures that improved the capability of 
seismic monitoring.91 Although a 150 kiloton test explosion could be 
detected using seismic monitoring anywhere in the world, due to 
margin of error problems any detection could have been as small as 75 
kilotons or as large as 300 kilotons.92 Thus, it needed cooperative 
measures to reduce the margin of error. To overcome the margin of 
error problem, the parties exchanged information regarding test sites 
and the surrounding geological environment.93 Parties also verified 
88 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 45 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html).  
89 Id. at 38. 
90 1963-77: Limits on Nuclear Testing, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY, http://www. 
ctbto.org/the-treaty/history-1945-1993/1963-77-limits-on-nuclear-testing/ (last visited 
Apr 10, 2015). 
91 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 54 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html); see also Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, ATOMIC ARCHIVE, 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty19.shtml (last visited on Apr 11, 2015). 
92 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 40 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html); Vink & Pine, The Politics of Verification: Limiting the Testing of 
Nuclear, 3 SCIENCE AND GLOBAL SECURITY 267 (1993). 
93 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 54 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
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each other by using satellites to “observe excavation and other 
evidence of nuclear testing.”94 
B. Cyber Applications of National Technical Means 
 Despite the differences between cyber weapons and nuclear 
weapons,95 some parallels exist between traditional NTM and NTM 
with cyber weapons. One possible cyber comparison to traditional 
NTM techniques such as the use of satellites, might be the use of 
network scanners96 and intrusion detection systems.97 For example, 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) describes a program 
known as Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) that quickly 
identifies and prioritizes cybersecurity risks.98 States can gain some 
information about attackers by scanning and monitoring their own 
networks. Network monitoring can show what kind of traffic is 
occurring between networks within two different states.99 For 
94 See Leith & Simpson, Monitoring Underground Nuclear Tests, in M. KREPON, P.D. 
ZIMMERMAN, L.S. SPECTOR, AND M. UMBERGER (eds.), COMMERCIAL OBSERVATION 
SATELLITES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (1990). 
95 See supra II. Cyber Attack Fundamentals. 
96 Margaret Rouse, “Network scanning is a procedure for identifying active hosts on a 
network, either for the purpose of attacking them or for network security assessment.” 
Network Scanning, TECHTARGET, 
http://searchmidmarketsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/network-scanning (last visited 
Apr 10, 2015). Network scanners such as NMAP allow a user to “determine what hosts are 
available on the network, what services (application name and version) those hosts are 
offering, what operating systems (and OS versions) they are running, what type of packet 
filters/firewalls are in use, and dozens of other characteristics.” Nmap Introduction, 
Nmap, http://nmap.org/ (last visited Apr 10, 2015). 
97 Intrusion detection systems serve to “identify unauthorized, illicit, and anomalous 
behavior based solely on network traffic. A network IDS, using either a network tap, span 
port, or hub collects packets that traverse a given network. Using the captured data, the 
IDS system processes and flags any suspicious traffic. Unlike an intrusion prevention 
system, an intrusion detection system does not actively block network traffic. The role of a 
network IDS is passive, only gathering, identifying, logging and alerting.” Intrusion 
Detection FAQ: What is Intrusion Detection?, SANS, http://www.sans.org/security-
resources/idfaq/what_is_id.php (last visited Apr 10, 2015). 
98 See Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, (Nov. 
6, 2015), http://www.dhs.gov/cdm. 
99 Dave Shackleford, Optimized Network Monitoring for Real-World Threats, SANS 
INSTITUTE (July 1, 2011), https://www.sans.org/reading-
room/whitepapers/analyst/optimized-network-monitoring-real-world-threats-35040. 
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example, states can monitor and analyze all traffic on particular TCP 
or UDP ports.100 Network monitoring will attempt to “match patterns 
of usage and behavior to detect malicious activity.”101 It can reveal 
what kinds of attacks are occurring on a network. However, fairly 
analogous to traditional NTM monitoring capabilities, cyber NTM also 
has its limitations.102 Due to the high volume of traffic, it can be 
difficult to catch malicious activity occurring within a network.103 
 Another parallel to traditional NTM would be to gain access (by 
launching a cyber attack or with permission) to another state’s 
computers, or routers that forward the other state’s internet traffic on 
to its intended destination.104 However, with that access a state could 
read other files on the computer or perform other malicious acts. The 
key to satellite and other NTM use is that it is not a violation of 
international law. In contrast, hacking into a computer to monitor 
activity might be viewed as a violation of international law.105 At the 
very least, needing to launch a cyber attack to verify that another state 
is not launching cyber attacks seems to defeat the purpose of having a 
cyber treaty.106 Thus, without a monitoring agreement between states, 
network monitoring would need to be limited to states monitoring 
their own networks. 
100 Id. at 7. 
101 Id. at 2. 
102 Companies and governments already use network scanners and intrusion detection 
systems. Although they are helpful, states still do not seem to have much trouble launching 
successful cyber attacks. See Paul Rubens, Cybersecurity: Defending 'Unpreventable' 
Cyber Attacks, BBC NEWS (Feb, 3 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31048811. 
103 Shackleford, supra note 99. 
104 JAMES F. KUROSE & KEITH W. ROSS, COMPUTER NETWORKING A TOP DOWN APPROACH 
394 (5th ed. 2010). 
105 INT'L GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO 
CYBER WARFARE 24 (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) (“The International Group of Experts 
could achieve no consensus as to whether the placement of malware that causes no 
physical damage (as with malware used to monitor activities) constitutes a violation of 
sovereignty.”).  “Although there are provisions of international law that allow the violation 
of another state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity to stop a harmful action that the 
originating state has not adequately addressed or does not have the means to address.” 
106 Id. at 36 (“A State injured by an internationally wrongful act may resort to 
proportionate countermeasures, including cyber countermeasures, against the responsible 
State”); Id. at 54 (“A State that is the target of a cyber operation that rises to the level of an 
armed attack may exercise its inherent right of self-defense.”). 
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 Another difficulty with NTM is that malware used in a cyber attack 
can be easily hidden in nearly any program or file. While it might not 
be too difficult to hide a nuclear missile launch pad, it is even easier 
for a state to hide a cyber attack.107 This is partially because attacks 
can be launched from a computer nearly anywhere in the world even if 
the state does not own the computer. With nuclear missiles there are 
specific areas, like military bases, for satellites to focus on. In contrast, 
cyber weapons can be hidden in any computer, mobile device and 
sometimes even refrigerators.108 For example, malware can be hidden 
in any Microsoft Office document.109 With the advent of the internet of 
things (IoT), there will be a proliferation of attack vectors because 
more devices will be connected to the internet.110 Thus, there will be 
even more places to hide malware as more devices become connected. 
According to the U.N. General Assembly, “[t]o be adequate and 
effective, a verification regime for an agreement must cover all 
relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities.”111 
However, with cyber weapons, every piece of code is relevant because 
malware can be hidden anywhere. This makes it difficult to cover all 
relevant facilities, locations, installations and activities. 
107 See supra II.B. 
108 Ryan Grenoble, Refrigerator Busted Sending Spam Emails in Massive Cyberattack, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 24, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/23/refrigerator-spam-email-internet-of-things-
attack_n_4654566.html. 
109 Kevin Casey, Retro Macro Viruses: They're Baaack, INFORMATION WEEK (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.informationweek.com/vulns-threats/vulnerability-management/retro-macro-
viruses-theyre-baaack/d/d-id/1279215; Macros Explained: Why Microsoft Office Files 
Can Be Dangerous, HOW-TO GEEK, http://www.howtogeek.com/171993/macros-
explained-why-microsoft-office-files-can-be-dangerous/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). Macro 
viruses are created using Microsoft Office’s application-specific programming language. 
See CHRISTOPHER ELISAN, MALWARE, ROOTKITS & BOTNETS: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 19 (2013). 
Microsoft Office uses Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) as its programming language. Id. 
These kinds of viruses are operating system independent because they depend only on the 
application and not the underlying operating system. Id. at 21. 
110 The Internet of Things is Far Bigger than Anyone Realizes, WIRED, 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ (“The Internet of 
Things revolves around increased machine-to-machine communication; it’s built on cloud 
computing and networks of data-gathering sensors; it’s mobile, virtual, and instantaneous 
connection; and they say it’s going to make everything in our lives from streetlights to 
seaports ‘smart’”).  
111 G.A. Res. 43/81, U.N. DOC. A/RES/43/81 (Dec. 7, 1988). 
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C. On-Site Inspections 
 On-site inspections (OSI) involve direct access to another state’s 
military sites. OSI greatly improved verification abilities with respect 
to nuclear weapons. In reference to OSI, defense secretary Caspar 
Weinberger stated that it is “absolutely essential that we have 
something better in the way of verification than we have ever had 
before … the ability to go on each other’s soil and …look in factories 
and look at gun sites. You have to have the ability to do what bank 
examiners do, if we want to be sure.”112 
 One example of OSI was the suspect site inspections (also known 
as challenge inspections). They allowed a party to inspect any site that 
it suspected might be violating the treaty.113 However, this type of 
inspection was not as strong as it might seem. With the exception of 
three designated sites in each country, a state could always refuse a 
challenge inspection.114 Further, parties were allowed to answer the 
challenger’s concerns by other means, if possible, and thus were able 
to avoid inspections entirely.115 Another type of inspection was known 
as continuous inspection or portal monitoring. It gave a party the right 
“to measure all vehicles existing in the facility and inspect the interior 
of those large enough to contain a banned missile.”116 
112 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 40 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html); J. Mendelsohn, INF Verification: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, 25-6 (1987) (“Caspar Weinberger on Meet the Press in September 
of 1986”); see also J. Dean, The INF Treaty Negotiations, SIPRI YEARBOOK, 375-94 (1988); 
Garthoff, The Soviet SS-20 Decision, 25:3 SURVIVAL, (1983); JONATHAN HASLAM, THE 
SOVIET UNION AND THE POLITICS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE 1969-87 (1990). 
113 START I: Protocol on Inspection and Continuous Monitoring Activities, ACQWEB, 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/start1/protocols/insp_7-12.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 
2015). 
114 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 48 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 42. For information on portal monitoring see S.I. Griffiths, The Implementation of 
the INF Treaty, SIPRI YEARBOOK 1990: WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT, OXFORD 
447 (1990). 
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 The Nuclear Test Ban treaty (NTB) allowed scientists to collect 
geological data and rock samples from the nuclear test site. This 
allowed a state to compare seismometer readings with on-site 
measurements and was “a real key to improving NTM.” 117 For 
example, inspectors took soils samples and made geological 
measurements to make sure that an illegal explosion could not be 
concealed.118   
D.  On-Site Inspections Cyber Applications 
 One potential cyber parallel to on-site inspections (OSI) would be 
cyber investigations or the use of cyber forensics. After discovering a 
cyber attack a state may find a likely source of the attack, perhaps a 
number of servers located in another state. Assuming that there is a 
cyber treaty between the two states, it would be useful for the treaty to 
contain a provision that allowed the victim state access to the suspect 
state’s networks for a cyber investigation. Similar to the forced 
cooperation in nuclear arms treaties, a cyber treaty could force states 
to cooperate by placing network taps119 that store network traffic for 
each other to examine when they suspect a cyber attack has occurred.  
Instead of using OSI’s physical presence, facility sampling, and 
personnel interviews, a cyber investigation could use session 
reconstruction, log inspection, and traffic analysis to verify the suspect 
state’s compliance with the treaty. In session reconstruction, captured 
packets are correlated with each other to determine what information 
117 C. Paul Robinson, Verifying Testing Treaties – Old and New, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,  3 
(1990); Dep’t of Def. Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1997 and the Future 
Years Def. Program: Hearing on S. 1745 Before the Committee on Armed Services United 
States Senate, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Dr. C. Paul Robinson, President, Sandia 
National Laboratories); Kathleen C. Bailey & C. Paul Robinson, To Zero or Not to Zero: A 
US Perspective on Nuclear Disarmament, 28:2 SECURITY DIALOGUE 149, 149-58 (1997). 
118 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1996), ATOMIC ARCHIVE, 
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty19.shtml (last visited on Apr 11, 2015); 
Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 57 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
119 Network Tap Definition, TECHTARGET, 
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/definition/Network-tap (“A network tap is an 
external monitoring device that mirrors the traffic that passes between two network nodes. 
A tap (test access point) is a hardware device inserted at a specific point in the network to 
monitor data”). 
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was sent between two computers.120 When the packets from the raw 
network data are reassembled, the data can be analyzed efficiently.121  
For example, session reconstruction would make it easy to search for 
keywords such as “bomb” in network data.122 The network packets can 
also be correlated with information contained in logs to provide a 
more comprehensive picture of what events have occurred.123  
 Traffic analysis can also be used as a defensive technique to 
identify anomalies in traffic patterns. It can be used to “baseline the 
traffic to and from hosts on the network over time, in a graphical 
format (line charts or other graphs).”124 The data can show how the 
network typically performs, “including packet quantity, packet sizes, 
bandwidth utilization, connections per hour, etc.”125 After learning 
what typical activity looks like, network administrators can detect 
“anomalies in connections between hosts and networks such as port-
scans, DoS attacks, significant increases in bandwidth utilization, and 
other factors that might indicate hosts that are under attack or have 
become compromised.”126 
 However, OSI that involves either a cyber investigation or physical 
presence at a facility would have several challenges. One key principle 
about verification arrangements is that they should be implemented 
without discrimination, and, in accomplishing their purpose, avoid 
unduly interfering with the internal affairs of State’s parties or other 
States, or jeopardizing their economic, technological and social 
development.127 One potential problem for OSI is that it may be 
difficult to establish without unduly interfering with the internal 
120 TCP Session Reconstruction, REDSPLICE (2016), https://www.redsplice.com/tcp-
session-reconstruction/. 
121 CyberForensics: Understanding Information Security Investigations 86 (Jennifer Bayuk 
ed. 2010). 
122 Id. 
123 Dave Shackleford, When Breaches Happen: Top Five Questions to Prepare for, SANS 
INSTITUTE, https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/breaches-happen-
top-questions-prepare-35220. 
124 Stephen Northcutt, Traffic Analysis, SANS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, 
http://www.sans.edu/research/security-laboratory/article/traffic-analysis. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 G.A. Res. 43/81, U.N. DOC. A/RES/43/81 (Dec. 7, 1988). 
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affairs of states. The problem stems from a lack of separation between 
cyber weapons and other harmless computer activities. Although 
inspecting another state’s cyber infrastructure could help one state to 
verify that it was not used to launch a cyber attack, the inspecting state 
could also gain access to a treasure trove of information. A state’s 
cyber infrastructure would likely hold very sensitive information, and 
by allowing another state to inspect the cyber infrastructure the state 
would run a risk of handing over the information to the inspecting 
state. Some of the data the inspecting state might look at, such as 
diplomatic communications, would be protected under international 
law from being accessed by other states.128 According to the Tallinn 
Manual,129 “[d]iplomatic archives and communications are protected 
at all times from cyber operations” regardless of whether the state is 
part of an armed conflict or not.130 
 However, this problem might be solved if the sensitive information 
were encrypted. Even if the network is tapped, the victim state will not 
be able to read encrypted network traffic. The victim state will be able 
to read the metadata (e.g. where the data was sent and the route it 
took to reach its final destination) and still gather useful clues relating 
to cyber attacks.131 In addition, states could obfuscate network 
infrastructure that contains sensitive data to prevent an investigating 
state from accessing it.132 States can create a subnet within a network 
to prevent inspection of the sensitive parts of the network.133 If 
128 See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations arts. 33, 35, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261.  
129 A manual on the “law governing cyber warfare” that was created by a group of 
international experts. INT’L GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 1, (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 
2013). 
130 INT’L GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 233, Rule 84, (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013); Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations arts. 33, 35, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; see also 
Tehran Hostages case, paras. 61-62, 77, 86; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations arts. 
33, 35, 24 April 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
131 Paul Assadoorian, Analyzing Network Metadata, TENABLE NETWORK SECURITY (Oct. 1, 
2009), https://www.tenable.com/blog/analyzing-network-metadata. 
132 Network Infrastructure Obfuscation, U.S. Patent No. 14/058,034 (Filed Oct. 18 2013), 
available at http://www.google.com/patents/US20140115706. 
133 Bradley Mitchell, IP Tutorial Subnets, ABOUT.COM, 
http://compnetworking.about.com/od/workingwithipaddresses/a/subnetmask.htm. 
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encryption and obfuscated networks are overused, however, the 
investigating state will have not have enough power to adequately 
verify treaty compliance. Thus, a treaty would need to find the proper 
balance between protecting sensitive data and allowing a victim state 
to investigate treaty compliance. 
 A recent example helps illustrate how OSI in the form of a cyber 
investigation could be useful for verification. The U.S. suspects that 
Unit 61398 of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is using cyber 
attacks to steal intellectual property.134 Mandiant, a cybersecurity firm 
released a report that reflects years of research on a hacker group 
named APT1.135  The Mandiant report concluded that APT1’s activities 
primarily occur in China and that the Chinese government is aware of 
the activities.136  The Mandiant report further concluded that APT1 is 
likely PLA unit 61398.137 The conclusions were based in part on 
evidence tracing APT1’s activity to four large networks in Shanghai, 
two of which serve the building where Unit 61398 is located.138 APT1’s 
remote desktop sessions used the Chinese (simplified) U.S. 
keyboard139 and 98% of the IP addresses used to log into APT1-
controlled systems were located in China.140  Mandiant was able to 
observe activity accessing hop points141 from 832 IP addresses over a 
two year period.142 The hop points were accessed through Remote 
134 Schmidt & Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-
with-cyberspying.html?_r=0. 
135 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT APT1, 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Microsoft’s Remote Desktop Client configures the keyboard based on the client’s 
language setting.  Id. at 4.   
140 Id. 
141 In this example, hop point refers to the computer that the hackers sent the attack from. 
Hackers will often send attacks from compromised computers that they do not own to 
avoid attribution. 
142 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT APT1, 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
2016] HODGSON 253 
Desktop143 and File Transfer Protocol (FTP).144 Of the 832 IP 
addresses observed, 817 resolved to locations within Shanghai, 
China.145 If the U.S. had network taps on networks in Shanghai, the 
U.S. might obtain even more evidence of cyber attacks or at least 
reduce the cost of cyber investigations. This might solve problems 
with attribution and make states less willing to perform cyber attacks 
if they know that the attacks can easily be traced back to them.   
 Another difficulty is that with cyber weapons, there are many 
locations to inspect. Malware can be hidden anywhere on any 
computer or server. Obvious locations to inspect would include 
computers on military bases and intelligence agency headquarters but 
it would be easy for a state to erase evidence, move evidence of cyber 
attacks to another location (if it knew its computers might be 
inspected), or use remote computers to launch the cyber attacks.  
E. Data Exchanges 
 Data exchanges are another key component of verification. 
According to the U.N. General Assembly, “[r]equests for inspections 
or information in accordance with the provisions of an arms limitation 
and disarmament agreement should be considered as a normal 
component of the verification process. Such requests should be used 
only for the purposes of the determination of compliance, care being 
taken to avoid abuses.”146 Several arms control treaties implemented 
ways for parties to exchange data about nuclear weapons. The INF 
treaty provided for Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers that managed 
“exchanges of baseline information and continuous data exchanges on 
the technical details of missiles.”147 Having an additional source of 
143 Connect to Another Computer Using Remote Desktop, Connect to another computer 
using Remote Desktop Connection, MICROSOFT, http://windows.microsoft.com/en-
us/windows/connect-using-remote-desktop-connection#connect-using-remote-desktop-
connection=windows-7. 
144  Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT APT1, 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). 
145 Id. 
146 G.A. Res. 43/81, U.N. DOC. A/RES/43/81 (Dec. 7, 1988). 
147 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 40 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
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information was useful because it allowed politicians more “leeway to 
publicize compliance judgments.”148 State leaders needed several 
methods to obtain information because it is more difficult for an 
opposing state to thwart multiple methods of collecting 
information.149 
 In the START verification regime, each party was required to 
provide the other full access to telemetric information from missile 
flight tests.150 The information access requirement "[a]pplied to nearly 
all [intercontinental ballistic missile] flight tests, not just those that 
might be considered a violation of the Treaty.”151 The parties agreed to 
exchange information on treaty-limited items and to notify each other 
of any future developments or changes to the treaty-limited items.152 
The parties also maintained a common database that contained 
“detailed records on the location and technical characteristics of all 
[t]reaty-related equipment.”153  
148 Id. at 43; US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report to Congress 1988, 
p. 63 – cited in A.F. Woolf, On-site Inspection in Arms Control: Verifying Compliance with
INF and START, Congressional Research Service 10, The Library of Congress, November 1, 
1989; See also J.K. DAVIS ET AL., THE INF CONTROVERSY: LESSONS FOR NATO 
MODERNIZATION AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS (1989). 
149 US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Annual Report to Congress 1988, p. 63 – 
cited in A.F. Woolf, On-site Inspection in Arms Control: Verifying Compliance with INF 
and START 10, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, November 1, 
1989. 
150 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-USSR, art. X, 
July 31, 1991, No. 102-20 [hereinafter START I]; Amy Woolf, Monitoring and Verification 
in Arms Control 13 (2011) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41201.pdf. 
151 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 47 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt) (on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
152 Amy Woolf, Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control 2 (2011) available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41201.pdf. 
153  Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 48 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html); Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive 
Arms, U.S.-USSR, art. VIII, July 31, 1991, No. 102-20. 
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F. Data Exchanges: Cyber Applications 
 If performed in a limited manner, data exchanges could be an 
effective and practical method for verification in cyber weapon treaties 
because it could be used to prevent the most destructive types of 
attacks. Exchanging data about cyber weapons would need to be 
limited because exchanging data about how the weapon works would 
likely render a cyber weapon ineffective. While states may be 
interested in preventing destructive attacks, they would likely not be 
willing to give up the intelligence gathering capabilities that cyber 
weapons offer. To understand why this is true, it is helpful to 
understand how malware remains effective and avoids detection. 
 Successful malware must be able to prevent anti-virus products 
from detecting its presence and it must also prevent anti-virus 
researchers from obtaining the malware source code.154 Once the 
malware source code is obtained, the researchers can update the anti-
virus products to recognize the malware and delete it immediately 
upon infection of a computer system.155 In malware analysis, 
researchers find a copy of malware and then try to determine the 
functions, capabilities, and code that the malware is using.156 Once the 
code is obtained the researchers can create “an effective signature to 
detect and eradicate the malware.”157 Thus, one instance of malware is 
typically not enough because if it is detected, a solution can be quickly 
made for all infected computers.158  
 Malware writers use a variety of anti-reversing and anti-analysis 
defenses to prevent researchers from successfully obtaining and 
analyzing the malware code.159 Some of the techniques include code 
154 CHRISTOPHER ELISAN, MALWARE, ROOTKITS & BOTNETS: A BEGINNER’S GUIDE 102 (2013). 
155 Mandiant has reported that Iran-based malware remains on systems for an average of 
28 days while China-based malware remains on systems for an average of 243 days. 
Beyond the Breach, MANDIANT, https://dl.mandiant.com/EE/library/WP_M-
Trends2014_140409.pdf. 
156 Dennis Distler, Malware Analysis: An Introduction, SANS INST., available at 
http://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/malicious/malware-analysis-
introduction-2103. 
157 ELISAN, supra note 154, at 115. 
158 Id. It should be noted that signature based anti-virus techniques are becoming 
ineffective. 
159 Id. at 140. 
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obfuscation,160 entry point obscuring,161 malware encryption162, and 
metamorphism.163 Hackers often use many malware samples, 
enabling the hackers to remain in control of a system even if one or 
two malware samples are caught by anti-virus researchers.164 This is 
partly why security researchers were finding 54,000 unique samples 
of malware per day in 2010.165 In addition, malware typically has an 
installer component that “installs the malware and all its components 
in a target system.”166 The installer often deletes itself after installing 
the malware to prevent anti-virus researchers from gaining 
possession.167  
 Thus, because malware depends so heavily on keeping its code 
secret, if a cyber treaty were to include verification methods that 
160 “In software development, obfuscation is the deliberate act of creating obfuscated code, 
i.e. source or machine code that is difficult for humans to understand. Like obfuscation in 
natural language, it may use needlessly roundabout expressions to compose statements.” 
Obfuscation (software), WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obfuscation_(software) (last visited May 12, 2016). 
161 Piotr Bania, Fighting EPO Viruses, SYMANTEC (Jun 28, 2005), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/fighting-epo-viruses (“An entry- point 
obscuring virus is a virus that doesn't get control from the host program directly. Typically, 
the virus patches the host program with a jump/call routine, and receives control that 
way.”). 
162 Attackers will encrypt malware to make it difficult for anti-virus researchers to 
understand what the malware is doing. See Encrypted malware and code reusability, 
SANS ISC INFOSEC FORUMS, 
https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Encrypted+malware+and+code+reusability/2223/. 
163 ELISAN, supra note 159, at 134-35 (stating that in metamorphism the malware uses a 
mutation engine that changes the code of the malware without changing its functionality 
making every infection different and harder to detect). 
164 Id. at 115. 
165 Id. at 153. 
166 Id. at 88. 
167 Id. The malware waits for an internet connection and then downloads necessary 
components allowing it to be small and hard to detect. Id. at 90-91. The malware installer 
can use a URL and a server. The Server can be one that is used for a legitimate looking 
website. Some examples include “online dropboxes, free web hosting sites, free cloud 
drives.” Id. at 92. This allows malware to escape a URL blacklist making it hard to detect. 
Id. In addition, it provides cover because the “only way to find out the exact location of the 
malware being hosted in the legitimate site is through analysis of a captured malware 
sample.” Id.  
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require parties to exchange details about the cyber weapons they use, 
the cyber weapons would become ineffective. Any data that reveals the 
functions and capabilities of malware would greatly assist anti-virus 
researchers in creating a solution that defeats the malware. States 
would likely be reluctant to share data about their cyber weapons if it 
rendered them useless and thus would not want to enter into a cyber 
treaty that contained data exchange provisions for cyber weapons. 
 However, states may find it practical to exchange limited amounts 
of data specific to only the most destructive types of attacks. For 
example, states could exchange data about cyber weapons that target 
industrial control systems or any weapons that target critical 
infrastructure such as financial services, nuclear reactors, dams, and 
chemical facilities.168 The disclosures could be limited to operating 
systems, protocols, and software that these systems use. This is 
especially true if cyber attacks become more damaging and occur 
more frequently. For example, the U.S. and China may enter into this 
type of exchange to prevent massive power outages.169  
G. Committees and Other Treaty Provisions 
 Several treaties also included committees and other treaty 
provisions to create a more robust verification regime. For example, 
the SALT regime created the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC). 
The SCC was a Joint body made of delegates from each party that met 
at least twice a year.170 Although the group had no legal or 
jurisdictional authority, it would obtain results by seeking to establish 
consensus between the parties.171 The purpose of the committee was to 
clear up ambiguities that were discovered as the treaty’s verification 
provisions were implemented.172 The group’s business was done in 
168 For a complete listing of critical infrastructure, see Critical Infrastructure Sectors, 
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors. 
169 See Steve Reilly, Bracing for a Big Power Grid Attack: One is too Many, USA TODAY 
(Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/03/24/power-grid-physical-
and-cyber-attacks-concern-security-experts/24892471/. 
170 Mitslal Kifleyesus-Matschie, The Role of Verification in International Relations: 1945-
1993, 37 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Erfurt, on file with author 
and available at http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-
10690/html/front.html). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
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private and was classified.173 Privacy allowed “serious negotiation and 
the resolution of disputes by allowing sensitive issues and ideas to be 
realized in the absence of public pressures.”174 In addition, the SCC 
was responsible for the agreed database that contained exchanged 
data on nuclear missiles.175 
 Further, the Nuclear Test Ban treaty contained at least one 
provision that might prove useful in a cyber verification regime. It 
contained a “whoops” clause allowing “for one or two slight 
unintentional breaches per year, which when noted by the other party 
would be termed a ‘cause for concern’ but not serious enough to 
warrant withdrawing from the treaty.”176  
H.     Cyber Applications of Committees and Other Treaty Provisions 
 A committee would be a useful mechanism to clarify requirements 
of a cyber treaty. It could, for example, clear up ambiguities on treaty 
provisions regarding cyber investigations such as network taps and 
network obfuscation. Just as the SCC’s activities were classified and 
private, a cyber verification committee’s business should also be 
classified to reduce public pressures. 
 A Whoops clause would be particularly useful with cyber weapons 
because they tend to proliferate and accidentally end up on systems 
they were not intended for. One example of this is the Stuxnet virus, 
which was used to disrupt Iran’s uranium enrichment program.177 
Although the virus was never meant to be used outside of Iran’s 
uranium enrichment facilities, it replicated itself and began spreading 
173 Id. 
174 J. Boulde, Bilateral Nuclear Agreements: The Standing Consultative Commission and 
the Special Verification Commission, in E. Morris (ed.), INT’L VERIFICATION ORG., CTR. FOR 
INT’L AND STRATEGIC STUDIES 205 (1991). 
175 Kifleyesus-Matschie, supra note 170, at 36. 
176 Id. at 56. 
177 David Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obama-ordered-
wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&seid=auto&smid=tw-
nytimespolitics&pagewanted=all (the virus “accidentally became public in the summer of 
2010 because of a programming error that allowed it to escape Iran’s Natanz plant and sent 
it around the world on the Internet.”). 
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throughout the internet due to a bug178 in the code.179 The proliferation 
of Stuxnet may not have caused a great deal of damage to ordinary 
computer users, but it is possible that the proliferation of another 
virus could cause significant damage.  It is possible that a future cyber 
attack launched by a state A against a state B would accidentally infect 
cyber infrastructure in a state C. If state A and state C had a cyber 
treaty with a verification regime then it would be useful for it to 
include a whoops clause excusing state A’s buggy cyber attack. Such a 
whoops clause could prevent state C from withdrawing from the 
treaty. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Despite the differences between cyber weapons and traditional 
weapons, verification methods used in treaties that limit nuclear 
weapons have several parallels that would be useful in a cyber treaty. 
Intrusion detection and network monitoring of the networks that a 
state controls parallels with NTM. Although there are some 
difficulties, cyber investigations would make a useful parallel to on-
site inspections. Data exchanges containing limited details about the 
most destructive cyber weapons would reduce the risk of attacks on 
critical infrastructure but still enable states to use intelligence 
gathering capabilities of cyber weapons. A committee that is able to 
clear up ambiguities in private would also be helpful with cyber treaty 
verification. A combination of these techniques could provide an 
effective verification regime for a cyber treaty.  
 Without verification it may be difficult to create an effective treaty 
to limit cyber attacks. Fortunately, cyber attacks are not as devastating 
as nuclear missiles (at least for now).180 Additionally, nuclear arms 
treaties have not eliminated nuclear weapons entirely. One major 
disincentive for a nuclear attack is the threat of a reciprocal attack. 
The same may be true for cyber weapons. For example, China would 
not want to launch a cyber attack to turn off the United States’ power 
178 Software Bug, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24864/software-
bug- (last visited Apr. 10, 2015) (stating that a software bug is an “an error, mistake, defect 
or fault, which may cause failure or deviation from expected results”). 
179 Sanger, supra note 177. 
180 No one has died from a cyber attack. Kelsey Atherton, Cyber Attacks Are America's Top 
Security Threat. That’s Better News Than It Sounds, POPSCI (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2013-03/cyber-attacks-were-named-top-
security-threat-%E2%80%99s-better-news-it-sounds. 
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grid because then the United States would do the same to China.181 
The threat of a reciprocal attack is one of the greatest deterrents 
available. 
181 Robert Lenzner, Chinese Cyber Attack Could Shut Down U.S. Electric Power Grid, 
FORBES (Nov. 28, 2014) http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2014/11/28/chinese-
cyber-attack-could-shut-down-u-s-electric-power-grid/. 
